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AUTH CG SAC
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HEADQUARTERS STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND (XRAY)
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS FAR EAST COMMAND
Office of the Chief of Staff
APO 500

6 June 1951

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State Dept. letter 3/20/85
DoD letter 6/7/85 NLW

Major General T. S. Power
Headquarters Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base
Omaha, Nebraska

Dear General Power:

In accordance with your instructions, I am hereby reporting my activities since your departure.

Most of my effort has been directed toward investigating the radar reconnaissance picture. Insofar as we are concerned here, radar reconnaissance requirement can be logically divided into two parts:

1. The obtaining of radar scope reconnaissance on Manchurian and Chinese targets, and

2. The obtaining of radar scope reconnaissance on Russian targets.

We feel that these are two separate parts of the problem. Since the JCS has given General Ridgway authority to reconnoiter Manchuria and China at his own discretion, the possibility of securing such reconnaissance now is a possibility. On the other hand, since he is not permitted to overfly Russian targets at this time, this problem should be dealt with in another manner.

RADAR SCOPE RECONNAISSANCE ON MANCHURIAN AND CHINESE TARGETS

At present, the only radar scope photos of targets included in our war plan and taken on the proper axis of attack are those of Targets Jane 347 and Catherine 891 on Sarsfield paper which were taken on the night of 5 June 1951 Tokyo time. Permission to fly additional reconnaissance sorties into Manchuria and China must be obtained from General Ridgway by General Weyland on a one time basis for each mission. General Terrill and I have discussed with General Crabb and General Ferguson the possibility of securing permission for additional reconnaissance of Manchuria and Northern China. They both feel that there is a good possibility of obtaining that permission from General Ridgway. At the present time, these missions (i.e. the one last night mentioned above) are directed by the Director of Intelligence, FEAF. In other

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words, Intelligence chooses the target and dispatches the B-45 to get the pictures and, incidentally, throws in as much airfield reconnaissance on the mission as possible. This allows Intelligence considerable leeway and leaves us open to being short-changed on occasion. General Crabb and General Ferguson recognize and lament the present system and both feel that when General Weyland officially takes over in the next few days, that they will then be able to get Intelligence out of the operation business. Our proposal to these two generals was as follows: (Providing that General Weyland agrees to the change mentioned above.)

1. Strategic Air Command (XRAY) would receive from Strategic Air Command a list of Manchurian and Chinese reconnaissance targets listed in order of priority. At present we have in the files a copy of a memo for the record dated 25 May, subject: "Target Listing for Reconnaissance Purposes", signed by Lt. Colonel Pickoff. We will use this list unless you desire to supplant it with another one.

2. General Terrill and I will set up each individual mission and set the requirement for the mission before General Weyland.

3. General Weyland will then, we hope, attempt to get permission from General Ridgway to execute the mission.

4. Upon receiving General Ridgway's approval, General Terrill as Bomber Command Commander will order the 91st to execute the mission.

We feel that by following this procedure we will have a better chance to improve the type and volume of radar scope photos that we require, primarily because we have a greater incentive to procure this information than does FEAF in general, and the Intelligence Division of FEAF in particular. General Crabb was very receptive to this suggested method of operation.

RADAR RECONNAISSANCE ON RUSSIAN TARGETS

After studying FEAF's emergency war plan, I discovered that FEAF was planning to use the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron to execute reconnaissance missions designed to fulfill not Strategic Air Command's but FEAF's reconnaissance requirements, much in the same manner as they are going to employ our standard bomb groups. Our requirement, as General Terrill and I see it, is to procure radar scope photos of Russian targets on "D" day so that our strike force will have the finished product on hand prior to executing the initial mission. We were able to persuade Colonel Warren of Combat Operations to change the FEAF initial war plan to specify that the activities of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron on "D" day would be directed by Strategic Air Command for any mission that Strategic Air Command desires. We agreed that if Strategic Air Command had any reconnaissance capability left over that we would try to help fulfill FEAF's requirement. We then discussed this change with General Crabb and General Ferguson who

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both agrred to the proposal. We will continue to monitor this until it is signed, sealed and delivered.

In order to properly utilize the 91st on "D" day, I recommend that Strategic Air Command prepare a reconnaissance operations order for the 91st to be executed on "D" day. Strategic Air Command Operations Order 52-51 contains such a directive, but 51-51 and 51a-51 do not.

To recapitulate, I recommend that the following be accomplished by Strategic Air Command Headquarters:

1. Manchurian and Chinese target radar reconnaissance.

a. Approve the suggested method of effecting radar reconnaissance as outlined above.

b. Establish a priority list of reconnaissance targets or give us authority to use the one in our possession (Pickoff's list as referred to above).

2. Russian target radar reconnaissance.

a. Furnish us with a reconnaissance operations order to be executed by the 91st on "D" day.

In addition to working on the reconnaissance problem, I have been occupied as follows:

1. I visited General Terrill at Yokota for two days and generally familiarized myself with Bomber Command operations.

2. Established a program whereby the target folders in the safe here in our office at the Dai Ichi Building will contain everything that the comparable folders at Guam contain so that we will always know exactly what Guam has on hand.

3. Rechecked on the air defence problem to reassure that in the event of emergency our bombers will not be shot down by friendly fighters. I am as sure as I can be that everything necessary has been done along these lines.

4. As you desired, I have been attempting to keep a watch on our position in order to determine if our position is deteriorating. The only strong indications along this line is that FEAF readily accepted our demands for the use of the 91st. It appears to me that if FEAF were so inclined, this particular issue could have been contested by them. By this, I infer that the position you established is remaining strong.

Sincerely,

WINTON R. CLOSE
Colonel, USAF

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